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Abstract
We introduce the MNIST-C dataset, a comprehen-
sive suite of 15 corruptions applied to the MNIST
test set, for benchmarking out-of-distribution ro-
bustness in computer vision. Through several
experiments and visualizations we demonstrate
that our corruptions significantly degrade perfor-
mance of state-of-the-art computer vision models
while preserving the semantic content of the test
images. In contrast to the popular notion of adver-
sarial robustness, our model-agnostic corruptions
do not seek worst-case performance but are in-
stead designed to be broad and diverse, capturing
multiple failure modes of modern models. In fact,
we find that several previously published adver-
sarial defenses significantly degrade robustness as
measured by MNIST-C. We hope that our bench-
mark serves as a useful tool for future work in
designing systems that are able to learn robust fea-
ture representations that capture the underlying
semantics of the input.
1. Introduction
Despite reports of superhuman performance on test datasets
drawn from the same distribution as the training data, com-
puter vision models still lag behind humans when evaluated
on out-of-distribution (OOD) data (Dodge & Karam, 2017).
For example, models lack robustness to small translations
of the input (Azulay & Weiss, 2018), small adversarial per-
turbations (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014),
as well as commonly occurring image corruptions such as
brightness, fog and various forms of blurring (Pei et al.,
2017; Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2018). Achieving robust-
ness to distributional shift is an essential step for deploying
models in complex, real-world settings where test data does
not perfectly match the training distribution.
Recently, (Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2018) proposed an OOD
benchmark for the CIFAR-10 and Imagenet datasets. This
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benchmark consists of 15 commonly occurring visual cor-
ruptions at 5 different severity levels and is intended as
a general-purpose robustness benchmark in computer vi-
sion. Smaller, simpler datasets such as MNIST continue
to play an important role during prototyping, when itera-
tion speed is paramount. MNIST is still commonly used
in robustness research today (Madry et al., 2017; Wang &
Yu, 2018; Frosst et al., 2018; Schott et al., 2018); however,
MNIST lacks a standardized corrupted variant. To this end
we propose MNIST-C1, a benchmark consisting of 15 image
corruptions for measuring out-of-distribution robustness in
computer vision. Our benchmark is inspired by Imagenet-C
and CIFAR-10-C, but is also specifically tailored to MNIST
which consists of low resolution, black-and-white images.
These 15 corruptions are carefully chosen out of a larger
pool of 31 corruptions2.
Through several experiments and visualizations, we demon-
strate that our benchmark is non-trivial, semantically invari-
ant, realistic, and diverse. Our corruptions capture failure
modes of models previously unidentified in literature. Rel-
ative to clean data, our corruptions increase error rates of
convolutional neural networks by a factor of 10 while pre-
serving the semantic content of the underlying image. Fur-
thermore, we evaluate 4 prior adversarial defense methods
and find that they all significantly degrade performance on
MNIST-C. We believe this shows that our robustness bench-
mark captures failure modes of computer vision that popular
measures of adversarial robustness fail to identify. Finally,
we demonstrate that simple data augmentation cannot triv-
ially solve this benchmark— training on all but one of the
corruptions yields minimal improvements on test accuracy
for the held out corruption, leaving a large gap between
neural network and human performance.
2. MNIST-C
Here, we briefly explain the 15 corruptions in MNIST-C.
Shot noise, impulse noise are random corruptions which
may occur during the imaging process. Glass blur simu-
1The source code for MNIST-C and download link are available
at http://github.com/google-research/mnist-c.
2While we recommend and publish results based on the subset
of 15 for evaluation, we will open source code for generating all
31 for researchers to experiment with.
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Figure 1. Randomly sampled applications of all 15 corruptions comprising MNIST-C
lates viewing the image through frosted glass by locally shuf-
fling pixels. Motion blur blurs the image along a random
line. Shear, translate, scale, rotate (Ghifary et al., 2015;
Engstrom et al., 2017) are each applied as an affine transfor-
mation to the image. Brightness increases the brightness
of the image. Stripe inverts the pixel values along a ver-
tical stripe in the center of the image. Fog simulates a
haze or fog using the diamond square algorithm. Spatter
occludes small regions of the image with randomly gener-
ated splotches. Zigzag, dotted line superimpose randomly
oriented zigzags and dotted lines over the image, with the
brightness of each straight segment controlled by an ex-
ponential kernel. Canny edges applies the Canny edge
detector to each image (Ding et al., 2019). The corrup-
tions of shot noise, impulse noise, glass blur, motion blur,
brightness, fog, and spatter are modified from Imagenet-C
(Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2018).
To construct MNIST-C we started with a broad suite of 31
image corruptions drawn from prior literature both on robust-
ness and image processing. These corruptions range from
different kinds of additive noise, blurring, digital corrup-
tions, geometric transformations, to superimposed zigzags
and squiggles. For each corruption we parameterize the
severity and then choose a severity level that degrades model
performance while preserving the semantic content. To
choose a good set of corruptions, we first sought to un-
derstand model behavior under these corruptions. To that
end we evaluated the performance of convolutional neural
networks on these corruptions through extensive data aug-
mentation experiments involving various combinations of
all 31 corruptions. These experiments allowed us to choose
a diverse set of corruptions which represent many differ-
ent classes of model failures, and avoid picking correlated
groups of corruptions on which model performance is very
similar. We choose the MNIST-C corruptions with the fol-
lowing principles in mind:
• Non-triviality
• Semantic Invariance
• Realism
• Breadth
Non-triviality: Each corruption should degrade the testing
accuracy of various models. We tuned the severity of each
corruption to a level that exposes blind spots of modern
MNIST-C
convolutional networks. As shown in a later section, we
demonstrate that the error rates of CNNs increase by up to
1000% (relative to clean MNIST error rates) when tested
on MNIST-C. Furthermore, we show that our benchmark
cannot be solved by naive data augmentation, nor prior
methods from the adversarial defense literature.
Semantic preservation: As our corruptions attempt to mea-
sure failures in computer vision systems, it is critical that
the perceived label of corrupted images remains invariant to
a human subject. We verify this by thorough visual inspec-
tion, and we include in the appendix a random sample of
images mis-classified by a simple CNN trained on standard
MNIST.
Realism: We took care to include corruptions which models
could plausibly encounter in the wild, not necessarily in
an adversarial setting. Our MNIST-C corruptions might
occur through real-world perturbations to the camera setup
(shot noise, impulse noise, motion blur, shear, scale, rotate,
translate), environmental factors (brightness, stripe, fog,
glass blur), or physical modification (spatter, dotted line,
zigzag, Canny edges).
Breadth: We also paid attention to the breadth of our cor-
ruptions. From an original working list of 31 corruptions
we selected 15 on the criteria of covering a wide swath
of possible corruptions, and also of avoiding redundancy
both in visual terms and in terms of overlap in performance
degradation of the models we tested. We present these 15
corruptions as our MNIST-C benchmark, though we release
the source code for all 31 corruptions and welcome further
work to use a different subset.
We will release both the source code for the corruptions as
well as the static, pre-computed MNIST-C dataset that we
used to evaluate various models, as well the algorithms used
to generate the corruptions are not optimized and unsuitable
for direct use in a training routine.
3. Experimental Results
We evaluate the MNIST-C corruptions against several mod-
els: a simple CNN (Conv1) trained on clean MNIST3, a
different CNN (Conv2) trained against PGD adversarial
noise (Madry et al., 2017), yet another CNN (Conv3) trained
against PGD/GAN adversaries (Wang & Yu, 2018), a cap-
sule network (Frosst et al., 2018), and a generative model,
ABS (Schott et al., 2018). The results are shown in Table 3.
We find that the baseline model Conv1 achieves 91.21%
accuracy when averaged over the entire benchmark, or a
1100% increased error rate relative to clean test accuracy
(99.22%). In the Appendix we show a random sample of
test errors made by Conv1 on each corruption. We find that
3Model definition taken from here.
a majority of model errors on MNIST-C are images which
are easy for a human to classify correctly.
A popular robustness metric in recent literature has been
adversarial robustness, where model performance is evalu-
ated against a suite of constrained optimization algorithms.
It is natural to ask whether or not methods which claim
improved adversarial robustness improve out-of-distribution
robustness, as there are theoretical connections between l2-
robustness and robustness to Gaussian noise (Ford et al.,
2019), and prior work has observed that adversarial train-
ing improves robustness on CIFAR-10-C. To that end we
investigated several previously published adversarial de-
fenses on our benchmark. Remarkably, we find that all
of the tested methods methods actually increase the error
rate on the benchmark relative to the clean model, we find
that mean accuracy on MNIST-C of the three adversarially
trained models is significantly lower rate of the clean model.
Translating accuracy values to error rate shows the three
adversarially trained models are 2.1-2.4 × as prone to error
as the clean model. The two alternative architectures, the
capsule network and the generative ABS model, also suffer
performance degradation relative to the baseline.
A more sophisticated metric, relative mean corruption er-
ror (relative mCE), was proposed to measure performance
on Imagenet-C (Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2018). Given a
classifier, f , a baseline classifier b, and a single corruption
c, the CE (corruption error) of f on c is computed as the
ratio between Efc , the error rate of f on c, and E
b
c , the error
rate of b on c. Similarly, relative CE is calculated from the
ratio of the change in error of f when it is evaluated on c
instead of the clean data, and the change in error of b when
it is evaluated on c instead of the clean data:
relative CEfc =
Efc − Efi
Ebc − Ebi
where i indicates the identity corruption that returns the
input image. Given these per-corruption CE and relative CE
values, we then take the average across all corruptions in
the dataset to compute mean CE and relative mean CE.
Relative mCE tells a similar story to mean accuracy in figure
2. Again, across the adversarially trained CNNs and the
alternative architectures we find large degradations in testing
performance, as quantified by the increases in relative mCE.
The fact that these methods actually degrade OOD robust-
ness measured through MNIST-C underscores the necessity
of evaluating future methods on a broader test suite in order
to quantify the robustness of a model. It is not so surpris-
ing adversarial training degrades performance on MNIST-C
despite the fact it dramatically improves performance on
CIFAR-10-C. Prior work has observed that the l∞-robust
model on MNIST (Madry et al., 2017) achieves robustness
MNIST-C
Figure 2. Mean test accuracy and relative mean Corruption Error (mCE) of various models on MNIST-C. Best performance is bolded.
by thresholding the input around .5, taking advantage of the
fact that MNIST pixel values are concentrated near 0 and 1
(Schott et al., 2018). Because none of our corruptions are
constrained to a small lp-ball, evaluating on our benchmark
can easily detect undesirable solutions which overfit to the
lp-robustness metric.
As our benchmark is designed to measure out-of-distribution
robustness, training models directly on the distributions in
the benchmark defeats its purpose. To demonstrate this, we
trained and tested model Conv1 on simple mixtures of the
31 corruptions initially came up with (see Table 4). We see
that one can trivially recover full accuracy on any single
corruption by simply finetuning4 on that corruption. We
performed a second data augmentation experiment where
we finetuned Conv1 on all but 1 one of the 31 corruptions,
and then tested on the held out corruption. Remarkably we
found that on average, training on all but 1 corruption only
improved robustness on the remaining hold-out corruption
from 90.4% accuracy to 91.7% accuracy, still far below the
human level performance. In a flagrant violation of “out-of-
distribution” robustness, we find that fine-tuning on all 31
corruptions together improves mean accuracy to 98.0%.
From this experiment we draw two conclusions. First, an
OOD benchmark loses its meaning when models are trained
directly on the corruptions— doing so would dramatically
overestimate the robustness of a model. Second, while
data augmentation can be a useful tool in improving robust-
ness and generalization (Geirhos et al., 2018; Cubuk et al.,
2018), the problem of generalizing to out-of-distribution
data remains highly nontrivial even when aggressive data
augmentation is used.
4. Conclusion
We present MNIST-C, a new robustness benchmark in com-
puter vision. We demonstrate that our benchmark exposes
new model failures that metrics in the adversarial robustness
cannot detect. We note that not only does our dataset mea-
sure a much more comprehensive notion of robustness, it
also reduces the difficulty of reproducibly evaluating robust-
ness. This stands in contrast to current state of measuring
adversarial robustness where reported robustness measure-
ments are continuously refuted (Carlini et al., 2019; Athalye
4Finetuning here simply means that we pre-train on clean
MNIST to convergence before switching to the corrupted training
set.
et al., 2018).
This, in our opinion, makes MNIST-C (and the related
CIFAR-10-C, and Imagenet-C) a more reliable benchmark
for measuring scientific progress of robustness in computer
vision. We hope that our benchmark serves as a useful tool
for future work.
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A. Additional Corruptions
Along with the 15 corruptions we selected for the MNIST-C
benchmark suite, we also release 16 additional corruptions
including. We briefly explain each of these corruptions here.
Speckle noise is a random corruption which may occur dur-
ing the imaging process. Pessimal noise is sampled from
a multivariate Gaussian with an adversarially trained co-
variance matrix and then tiled in a 2x2 pattern across the
image. We intended this as a proxy for worst-case non-
interactive corruption. The covariance matrix is trained via
SGD to maximize the training loss of model Conv1 and then
frozen at test time when the corruption is applied. Gaussian
blur applies a Gaussian kernel to the image. Defocus blur
simulates a defocused camera lens. Zoom blur simulates
increasing focal length during image capture. Frost over-
lays a random crop from one of six images of real frost.
Snow transforms and blurs Gaussian noise to simulate the
appearance of snow. Contrast reduces the contrast of the
image. Saturate increases saturation of the image. JPEG
compression runs the lossy JPEG compression algorithm
on the image. Pixelate distorts the image by resizing down
and then back to the original size. Elastic transform ap-
plies a random affine transformation to each square patch in
the image. Quantize reduces the color range of the image
by rounding each pixel value to evenly spaced values. Line
superimposes a randomly oriented lines over the image,
where the brightness of each straight segment is determined
by an exponential kernel. Inverse inverts the pixel values
of the entire image.
Speckle noise, Gaussian blur, defocus blur, zoom blur, frost,
snow, contrast, saturate, JPEG compression, pixelate, and
elastic transform are taken from (Hendrycks & Dietterich,
2018).
B. Additional Results
We report the test accuracy of all 6 models we benchmarked
on MNIST-C in figure 3.
In figure 4, we show the effects of simple data augmentation
on training Conv1. The left two columns represent data
augmentations that do not directly access the corruption
on which the model is tested, and the right two columns
represent data augmentations that do directly access the test
corruption.
C. Corruption Error Examples
We showcase several randomly sampled test errors made by
model Conv1 on each corruption in MNIST-C. See figures
5, 6, 7, 8.
The notation
A→ B (True: C)
denotes model prediction of A on the original image and B
on the corrupted image, where C is true label.
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Figure 3. Test accuracy of various models on MNIST-C. Highest accuracy per row is shaded green, lowest accuracy is shaded red, and
average accuracy is shaded white.
MNIST-C
Figure 4. Test accuracy of training Conv1 with simple data augmentation methods on MNIST-C. Clean refers to no augmentation, single
trains and tests on a single corruption, all-but-one trains on all 31 but the tested corruption, and all trains on all 31 corruptions.
MNIST-C
Brightness
3 → 1 (True: 3) 9 → 1 (True: 9) 8 → 0 (True: 8) 7 → 8 (True: 7) 6 → 4 (True: 6)
Canny Edges
1 → 8 (True: 1) 3 → 8 (True: 3) 2 → 6 (True: 4) 1 → 8 (True: 1) 9 → 8 (True: 9)
Dotted Line
4 → 4 (True: 9) 2 → 2 (True: 7) 2 → 2 (True: 8) 4 → 2 (True: 4) 7 → 9 (True: 7)
Fog
9 → 8 (True: 9) 5 → 6 (True: 5) 6 → 0 (True: 6) 1 → 1 (True: 7) 3 → 4 (True: 3)
Figure 5. Randomly sampled test errors by Conv1 on brightness, Canny edges, dotted line, and fog.
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Impulse Noise
8 → 5 (True: 8) 4 → 7 (True: 4) 8 → 8 (True: 7) 8 → 3 (True: 8) 7 → 2 (True: 1)
Stripe
0 → 5 (True: 0) 0 → 5 (True: 0) 9 → 2 (True: 9) 0 → 4 (True: 0) 5 → 0 (True: 5)
Motion Blur
8 → 3 (True: 8) 0 → 3 (True: 0) 8 → 3 (True: 8) 8 → 5 (True: 8) 6 → 5 (True: 6)
Glass Blur
9 → 4 (True: 9) 1 → 8 (True: 1) 2 → 2 (True: 3) 9 → 7 (True: 9) 9 → 4 (True: 9)
Figure 6. Randomly sampled test errors by Conv1 on impulse noise, stripe, motion blur, and glass blur.
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Translate
0 → 9 (True: 0) 2 → 7 (True: 2) 7 → 1 (True: 7) 1 → 4 (True: 1) 5 → 1 (True: 5)
Rotate
3 → 7 (True: 3) 5 → 3 (True: 5) 2 → 0 (True: 2) 6 → 0 (True: 6) 8 → 6 (True: 8)
Scale
8 → 3 (True: 8) 4 → 7 (True: 4) 9 → 9 (True: 4) 7 → 1 (True: 7) 8 → 0 (True: 8)
Shear
8 → 2 (True: 8) 9 → 4 (True: 9) 8 → 2 (True: 8) 9 → 4 (True: 9) 2 → 8 (True: 2)
Figure 7. Randomly sampled test errors by Conv1 on translate, rotate, scale, and shear.
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Shot Noise
1 → 8 (True: 1) 6 → 5 (True: 6) 4 → 9 (True: 4) 5 → 2 (True: 5) 7 → 3 (True: 7)
Spatter
9 → 7 (True: 9) 8 → 5 (True: 8) 9 → 7 (True: 9) 1 → 4 (True: 1) 6 → 4 (True: 6)
Zigzag
7 → 2 (True: 7) 4 → 9 (True: 4) 1 → 4 (True: 1) 3 → 2 (True: 3) 1 → 6 (True: 1)
Figure 8. Randomly sampled test errors by Conv1 on shot noise, spatter, and zigzag.
